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ral histories represent the recollections
and opinions of the person interviewed,
and not the official position of MORS.
Omissions and errors in fact are corrected when
possible, but every effort is made to present the
interviewee’s own words.
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, US Navy
(retired), FS, was President of MORS from
1985 to 1986. In 1989 hewas elected a Fellow
of the Society (one of the first five Fellows
elected in MORS) and in 1989 he also re-
ceived the Vance R. Wanner award. Wayne
received the Institute for Operations Re-
search and Management Science/Military
Application Society (INFORMS/MAS) J.
Steinhardt Prize in 2009. Wayne’s original
MORS oral history consisted of three inter-
views and was published inMilitary Opera-
tions Research in 2004, (volume 9, number 4).
Given Wayne’s continued contributions to
military operations research, a follow-up in-
terviewwas initiated in 2014. The interview
was conducted on October 10, 2014, with
Wayne Hughes and Jerry Brown in Monte-
rey, California, and Mike Garrambone and
Bob Sheldon on the telephone.
MORS ORAL HISTORY
Interview with Mr. Wayne P. Hughes,
FS; Dr. Jerry Brown, Mr. Mike Garrambone,
and Dr. Bob Sheldon, FS, Interviewers.
Jerry Brown: We’re at the Naval Post-
graduate School (NPS) along with Captain
Wayne Hughes, Professor of Practice in
the Operations Research Department, for
a continuation of his MORS oral history in-
terview, a follow-up.
You mentioned earlier that having data
on hand is important. Do you consider
that still a great idea that the data be
out there and readily available to start
a study?
Wayne Hughes: You don’t start with
easy questions. The answer is sometimes
and sometimes not. The salvo equations
are very successful in enlightening modern
missile combat parametrically and you re-
ally need to do parametric analysis, because
combat is going to depend a great deal
on the specific circumstances—how many
ships you’ve got in the battle, howmany en-
emies you’ve got, what their capabilities
are, and if you’re trying to design a fleet or
design a new tactic to go with a new tech-
nology, all of these things are unknowable.
On the other hand, everybody should
have a data bank to draw from. And one
of the things I think we did reasonably well
was, as the old saying goes, when there’s
a war on, study the war. Study the war,
don’t build simulations. I think we did that
fairly well, although the Army folks have
come back expressing a mixed bag about the
extent to which the data is trustworthy—
everybody knows that data gathered in war-
time is dirty data. That’s Clayton Thomas’s
famous saying, but data is probably cleaner
now than it has been in the past, and it all de-
pends on what you want to do—how your
data bank will be used.
I would distinguish what they do in
Washington to get hypothetical data or real
data that goes into big combat simulations
from the combat data that goes into war-
games such as we used at the Naval War
College in the 1920s and 1930s, and then
again with more mechanized systems in
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
And I would distinguish those from
tactical analysis, which has got to be pretty
strong parametrically, and therefore the
model that you choose must be appropriate
and very strong, and finally, in wartime,
we need to have the analyst in the field
embedded with decision makers the way
we first discovered the use of operations re-
search in Britain with the Battle of Britain
and in the Atlantic with Morse and
Kimball’s work in World War II.
Bob Sheldon: Since it was 11 years ago
that we did your original oral history, are
there any topics we addressed then that
merit revisiting?
Wayne Hughes: Yes, but I think the place
to start is what happened since 2003 when
you interviewed me. That was in the early
days of my being the Dean of the Graduate
School of Operation Information Sciences
(GSOIS), and there’s new background there
for me career-wise, 14 more years of analy-
sis and 14 more years of administration. As
the dean, I had the best four departments in
terms of leadership, faculty, the body of stu-
dents that were involved, and we did not
have a student enrollment problem.
Student quota fills have become a prob-
lem here at NPS, but not for GSOIS. For ex-
ample, the Defense Analysis Department
went from an annual input of about 15 stu-
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to an input of about 75 students per year after
that, and my other departments, for example,
Computer Science have no problem with stu-
dents. The Information Sciences Department
has no problem with students, and of course
Operations Research is still strong, admired,
and is doingwell with students, and that contin-
ued duringmy four and a half years as the dean,
and since then. And my chairmen have been
very strong, too. I always thought I could try
any crazy notion out on them, and if it wasn’t
going to fly, they’d say, ‘‘Wayne, we did that be-
fore and it failed,’’ or, ‘‘Wayne, that’s the dumb-
est thing we ever heard of.’’ That gave me the
freedom to try things, and invent things, and
some of them are pretty good. We inspired
risk-taking in my graduate school.
The second thing that happened after I was
the dean that I would emphasize was down-
shifting. I’ve said that every officer or every pro-
fessor should find two officers or professors
who are smarter than they are and nurture their
careers, and I’ve successfully done that now. I
lost Captain Starr King, because he died in amo-
torcycle accident, but Jeff Kline has virtually
taken over the campaign analysis course, which
is a key course in our curriculum, and he teaches
it better than I did—he gives them tougher
problems, because we’ve got the technology
now to do pretty complicated studies at the
campaign level in about three weeks’ time.
The second guy I claim as my replacement
is Dr. Timothy Chung, who teaches, mentors,
and advises theses in the area of unmanned ve-
hicles. He’s a wiz, and I wish there were three
like him on campus. But in any event, I per-
suaded Tim that he was underappreciated in
the Operations Research Department, which in
some ways is focused on specific tools, and slot-
ted him into a place where he can shine, and he
certainly does shine in the Systems Engineering
Department, and has now earned worldwide
respect. So I claim my replacements, and I’m
phasing down, but I’m not out. I just signed
on a new thesis student a week ago.
Bob Sheldon: MORS has evolved over the
years due to changed ethical rulings and con-
strained travel budgets, et cetera. How do you
feel about how MORS has adapted?
Wayne Hughes: I’m proud of how well we
have tried in really difficult times. I have never
seen so much effort to cut back on costs in all
the wrong places. Travel has crippled us badly;
it’s reduced the number of people who can at-
tend symposia, and virtually forced us to be in
the Washington area, and those necessities are
dreadful.
We will be healthy when professors and
businessmen and industry people can travel to
places like the Naval Postgraduate School or
West Point, which was the last place we tried
to go and couldn’t. Our leadership has been su-
perb, steering MORS through difficult times,
but I don’t want to downplay the need for us
to get back up on the step, make sure our spon-
sors appreciate us, and get our MORS symposia
back to what they used to be.
Mike Garrambone: It’s been a while, but
please confirm your earlier thoughts on the im-
portance that operations researchers need to be
strong students of history and military tactics.
Wayne Hughes: I will, indeed. The complete
operations analyst is not just a civilian. He’s
a line officer. He has fleet experience. In the best
of worlds, he has had command. For example, I
had command as a lieutenant, and it was very
important in my growth when I learned to be
an operations analyst.
So he’s a line officer with fleet experience.
He studied naval combat in the past, and the
reason for that is so he understands what the
lessons of history are. There are trends going
on, that is to say, things that are changing. There
are constants that don’t change like leadership,
and then there are the variables of the individu-
al battles that you cannot predict. Those are the
things that you gain by studying history. It’s not
a repeat of the past. It is learning how not to re-
peat the past, especially the mistakes.
So first, the perfect Navy operations analyst
has the knowledge of a line officer. Second, he
knows history. Third, he is educated to admire
objectivity. By that I mean he practices doing
the best he can to not insert personal bias, and
he also is suspicious of every analyst until he’s
convinced that that analyst’s product is not rep-
resentative of a personal bias of the analyst or
the analyst team that did the work for him.
When I mean he’s being objective, he’s using
quantitative skills in what we call operations
analysis now. Yeah, those are the qualities I
would emphasize.
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I have known and admired many civilian
analysts. I’ve known and admired many of
our analysts at the Naval Postgraduate School
who do research as part of their profession. I
think the best analysts are thosewho have broad
experience, however, and if they’re civilian ana-
lysts, that means they have experience on a fleet
staff, like the OEG (Operations Evaluation
Group) analysts, or in one of the key staffs in
the Pentagon like the Office of Net Assessment,
OSD CAPE (Office of the Secretary of Defense
Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation), or
CAA (Center for Army Analysis).
Jerry Brown:An aside, I just finished reading
James Kilpatrick’s Night Battles in the Solomons,
which was a gift from Captain Hughes to Cap-
tain Kline. I’m looking forward to being able
to dive there for 15 days in two weeks, and
one of my bucket list events is Iron Bottom
Sound, so here we go. That story is remarkable.
Bloody lessons. Few people know that we lost
more Navy personnel than the Marines lost on
Guadalcanal while trying to protect the
Marines.
WayneHughes: In that vein, TerryMcKearney,
Past President of MORS and present editor of
Phalanx, wrote his thesis for me on the battles in
the Solomon Islands. I went back and looked at
theses I’ve sponsored, and there have been 120
of them, and his was one of the best.
Terry showed that when there was a pause
after the night battles of Guadalcanal, CDR
Arleigh Burke came out there in January 1943,
and there were Admirals Tip Merrill and Pug
Ainsworth, and they changed the tactics. In-
spired by Arleigh Burke, they figured out ways
to exploit radar, using torpedoes as the decisive
weapon, and by the end of 1943 we were win-
ning some very decisive battles. But it took us
six months to figure out why our daytime
gun-based tactics weren’t working in night
battles.
Terry McKearney wrote a superb thesis,
which is a good supplement to Kilpatrick.
Studying the battles in the Solomon campaign,
and the interaction between land, sea, and air
is the finest way to bring yourself up to date
on how littoral operations are conducted. As
an aside, I would point out that the PT boats
were there, and they were so frightening that
the US PT boats were told to stay in port
whenever the US destroyers went up the slot,
and then they unleashed the PT boats to attack
the Japanese as wild men on their own. Sur-
prise, and sneakiness—PT boats were good at
that.
Mike Garrambone: You first published your
book Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice in 1986
and then youwrote a revised version called Fleet
Tactics and Coastal Combat in 1999. Is there any-
thing new you’re writing in the area of tactics?
Wayne Hughes: I’ll do a reprise. Yes, in Janu-
ary 2015 therewill be a tactics anthology coming
out, published by the Naval Institute Press. It
shows that fleet tactics are just one element—a
paramount element, but not all of naval tactics.
For example, I talk about single ship actions
starting with the frigates in the War of 1812,
and illustrated by William B. Cushing’s sinking
the Confederate CSS Albemarle in coastal
waters—in riverine waters; and my hero,
Thomas Cochrane sinking ships—tearing up
the Spanish coast and then going to South
America and serving as a model for both C.S.
Forester’s Horatio Hornblower and Jack
Aubrey—the hero of Patrick O’Brian in the se-
ries that starts with Master and Commander.
Secondly, I included in the anthologyAdmi-
ral Jim Stavridis’ lovely article in the Proceedings
he wrote when he was a lieutenant commander.
He asserted the US ASW (antisubmarine war-
fare) strategy had become stultified and de-
scribed how to add flexibility to our campaign
plans. We needed to relax our rigidity and be
adaptable to changes the Sovietswould almost cer-
tainly inflict on us. Point being, ASW tactics are
different from fleet battle tactics. It’s a campaign-
level kind of operation.
The new anthology has a lot of different
aspects than Fleet Tactics, which is about the
winning of battles. Fleet Tactics does cover pro-
jection of power, but there is also some of that
and so on and so forth. I should mention strate-
gic deterrence. There’s a nifty closing essay
written byme called ‘‘Missile Chess’’ on the sig-
nificance of missile warfare, starting with the
strategic deterrence.
Let’s see—I was also going to mention that
I’ve been considering a new edition of Fleet Tac-
tics and Coastal Combat, even though I think that
the old edition has held up very well, including
the chapter on the Battle of the Aegean, which is
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set in 1998, but is still highly relevant in under-
standing operations in restricted waters such as
the Eastern Mediterranean or the China Seas.
The aim is not to destroy or totally defeat an en-
emy, but to contain an enemy and prevent the
outbreak of a huge and major war. It’s interest-
ing to see the potential roles of the ships in that.
However, I’m contemplating it and I’m un-
der pressure from the Naval Institute to start
a third edition. I did think I should put more
on cyber operations, which are certainly promi-
nent now. In 1979, I forecast the coming robotics
age. Well, the robotics age is upon us now, and
we came to the missile age about 1970, but
now we must pay more attention, not to our
own development of autonomous vehicles, but
how the enemy’s capabilities with autonomous
vehicles will change the nature of the fleet and
the nature of how we analyze battles. That’s
a quick summary of two developments. I’ve
had a number of other publications, but for
book length, that’s where I am now.
Mike Garrambone: Some time ago, you di-
rected me to a paper called A Concise Theory of
Combat. Can you tell us more about the back-
ground of this work, and its general contents?
Wayne Hughes: A Concise Theory of Combat
was done by Wayne Hughes, Ted Dubois, and
Larry Low when we were all members of the
Military Conflict Institute. The Military Conflict
Institute had been trying to fuse operational
analysis at the campaign, strategy, and tactics
levels, not so much the new technology side,
with the lessons learned in real combat with
a great deal of emphasis on Vietnam and why
Vietnamwas amess.Wemet frequently and dis-
cussed the thing, but in the end we decided if
there was actually going to be a product that
was useful, it should start with the tactical side.
So the three of us got together, all being on the
West Coast here, and produced the book.
What did it say? A couple of examples. The
reason that combat models fail is because they
have trouble capturing anything but the physi-
cal properties of the battle—how many casual-
ties, how much territory was exchanged. But
the real phenomena of combat, we asserted,
was a matter of the physical, the mental, and
spiritual activities that were going on: what
made a man keep fighting, and how were deci-
sionsmade and how all those affected the battle.
Sowe said that you shouldn’t try too hard to
capture all the details of the battle in its physical
nature, because some of the dominant features
of them are moral and mental. We also defined
the different activities of battle and that led to
saying that what you send to a theater such as
Guadalcanal is combat potential. You do not
have combat power except latently in the forces
you send to a theater. Combat power is a dy-
namic thing that is exercised when you actually
shoot at somebody or maneuver on somebody.
So that led to a description of the creation of
combat power as being an originating element,
which does something like shoot or move. That
originating element takes an action. The origi-
nating elementmay have inmind a result of that
action, which is kill the enemy; but the effect on
the actual enemy, who is the third part of the ac-
tivity, gets to vote, too, because he may duck, so
he survives and is not killed. On the other hand,
there is a powerful effect because he can’t shoot
back because he’s so busy ducking. So the defi-
nition of a combat activity was another feature
that we emphasized. An activity is an element
taking an action on a receiving element.
Let me think about this for just a second. So
one more thing to illustrate. The power of pre-
diction, therefore, of a combat model is muted,
because the enemy gets a vote and your inten-
tion may be to kill him, but the effect may be
to suppress him, and a lot of battles are won
on the ground and sometimes in the air by cur-
tailing the enemy’s action—getting him to run
away, getting him to hide—as opposed to actu-
ally killing him.
But be that as it may, we emphasized the
limitations as well as the strength of quanti-
tative analysis, andmuchmore inAConcise The-
ory of Combat. There’s a more recent publication,
which has a bigger ambition. I’m not sure if it is
a bigger success, but you can go to the Military
Conflict Institute website (www.militaryconflict.
org) and find A Philosophy of War. Imagine what
is in that, and imagine how relevant it is today
when we’re dealing with terrorists as one as-
pect of conflict and war. A Philosophy of War
is really a philosophy of conflict, but it’s not
called that.
Mike Garrambone: Your book was included
in the MORS collection with a recommended
reading online, and we thank you for that.
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Wayne Hughes: Certainly A Concise Theory of
Combat belongs in the list, and get in touch with
me if you want to include A Philosophy of War,
too.
Mike Garrambone: Have you supported the
use of wargames as an analytical or insightful
tool either as a game designer, a game conduc-
tor, consultant, or a game participant?
Wayne Hughes: I have a reputation as being
suspicious of or hostile toward wargames, and
that is wrong. I love wargames, but I don’t love
them as an exclusive mode of analysis. In fact, I
think the best results occur when wargames are
used in one of two ways, and I use the Naval
WarCollege as a placewhere I have participated
in games as the example.
When wargames were in their heyday and
most successful, it was in the period after World
War I, but by then they were well shaken down.
The skill of naval wargames started about 1885.
By the 1920s we were using gaming to under-
stand the war in the Pacific most specifically,
and it was highly successful, but we did a hell
of a lot of wargames in order to learn things that
Hector C. Bywater, author of The Great Pacific
War, captured in one book.
It was not a very efficient tool for develop-
ing the tactics and the strategy and the cam-
paign plan for the Pacific War. So one of the
modern tools of wargaming is now to get the
human factors in and figure out what you want
to studymore carefully and inmore detail. Then
you don’t go to another wargame. You go to
a campaign simulation or mathematical analy-
sis, and in some instances, you go to sea and
do a fleet exercise to verify what you think
you learned in the wargame.
The opposite is also an effective use of war-
games, which is to do a campaign study, proba-
bly short, sweet, swift, and incomplete, and
then expand on it by doing it again in more de-
tail using a wargame. I’d also, in closing, make
one more comment. Wargames are remarkably
broad in their variety. Seminar games are vastly
different from the kind of wargame that I was
talking about done by the Naval War College.
Each type of game has its own advantages
and disadvantages, but they all have a human
participant—an active participant who plays a
role—and human participants are both a strength
and a weakness.
The strength is when you get human deci-
sion making involved, you see what influences
people or think will influence people when the
actual situation arises. The other side of the coin
is of course you are a victim of the perception of
the actual players and there’s no such thing as
a generic wargame player unless you turn the
wargame into a simulation and let the simula-
tion make some of the decisions.
Mike Garrambone: You’re famous for your
various and numerous book reviews. Have
you reviewed anything recently you’d like to
comment on?
Wayne Hughes: No, I’ve sort of withdrawn
and in fact the most recent review was at the re-
quest of one of our greats, Saul Gass. I reviewed
his book in 2012, and it did appear in my col-
umn. Almost all the book reviews—a few have
been in the Naval War College, but almost all
of them have been in Phalanx out of loyalty to
the organization. The title of the column was
‘‘Worth Reading,’’ and I made it a point never
to review a book I did not like. I only reviewed
books that I wanted to endorse and encourage
people to read. I picked the best books and I
was worried when I got Saul Gass’s book.
I worried that I wouldn’t want to review the
thing if I didn’t approve of it. But happily, it’s
very well done, because it contains profiles of
the pioneers and innovators in operations re-
search. It’s a big book, and it cost $99.00 at the
time, but that’s the last book I’ve reviewed.
I’ve always had a couple more in mind, but I
haven’t gotten around to writing them up for
Phalanx. If Terry McKearney bugs me, I might
have to do something.
Mike Garrambone: My dad served in the Pa-
cific on the battleship USS Missouri (BB-63) in
World War II. What might be different from
his perspective, parenthetically travel time,
weapons, allies, et cetera, that we have learned
about this region?
Wayne Hughes: Now that’s a very big ques-
tion, but it’s a very pertinent question, and let
me see if I can say the essentials and if anybody
wants to ask me follow-up questions, feel free.
Missouri was built as a capital ship. Capital
ships go out and meet up with other capital
ships and gain control of the seas. By the time
it was actually commissioned, the capital ship
role had been replaced by aircraft carriers.
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Battleships turned out to be very useful, but
not as capital ships winning battles at sea, but in
the projection of power role both in the Atlantic
theater and in the Pacific theater as naval gunfire
support ships. They could reach up to 20 miles,
so that would mean they were shooting 10 to
15 miles inland, and they made a very big bang
with 14-inch and 16-inch guns. So they were use-
ful, but not for the purpose they were built. The
same phenomenon is now happening with air-
craft carriers. They are so big and expensive that
they can’t go out and fight for command of
the sea.
Aircraft carriers can’t even go into the very
dangerous waters of the most dangerous coun-
tries, but their very successful role in the time
of the Soviet Union was to scare the bejesus
out of the Soviet Union by threatening to make
attacks on the mainland, and after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, by achieving a long series
of attacks unhindered by the defenders because
we were strong enough, or the enemy thought
wewere, that we could pound him in the projec-
tion of power mission. They were essential in all
the wars and other incidents that we’ve been in.
For example, Afghanistan phase one and phase
two, and Iraq in Desert Storm and in Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
But the carrier like the battleship has shifted
its role from being a capital ship to win com-
mand of the sea to a projection of power capabil-
ity. The issue of maintaining command of the
sea is one that everybody is struggling with
now, and happily, we can concentrate pretty
much on littoral waters and so far have not
had to worry about competition for command
that might lead to the sea battles as in World
War I and World War II.
Mike Garrambone:What about the area of the
Pacific as being a major concern, principally
where my dad served. He talked a great deal
about being in the Pacific and island hopping,
so he knew more about the important things
that took place there, but I suspect the area has
changed significantly.
Wayne Hughes: The Pacific is where the ac-
tion is shifting now. We’re struggling to think
about how to maintain a viable presence and
a commitment in the other waters—I’m think-
ing of the Baltic and the Norwegian Sea, and
in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean,
and in the Persian Gulf as we struggle to put
proper emphasis on the Pacific as the theater
of greatest interest. And yes, of course, I’d never
say a battleship was irrelevant, because even
now people talk about bringing them back as
a naval gunfire warship, because they were so
sturdy and they could take punishment.
I should mention one incident in the spirit
of the shift to the Pacific, but it is an important
incident because it’s the last one I know in
which battleships were fighting, and that was
in Operation Desert Shield getting ready for
Desert Storm, and the battleship Missouri was
doing shore bombardment off Kuwait, and we
were getting ready or at least staging for an am-
phibious landing in Kuwait, and we had to
soften up the landing site and were doing that
with the 16-inch guns from the battleship.
We upset the Iraqis sufficiently that they
fired two old fashioned high-flying, large
slow—that is to say, Mach 1 missiles at her,
and we shot down one, but the US Navy didn’t
do it. HMS Gloucester shot it down, and it was
kind of an embarrassment, because theMissouri
was firing from 18miles at sea, and yet weman-
aged not to get any shots off from American
SAM (surface-to-air missile) ships and the
Gloucester actually fired an over-the-shoulder
shot when it was past CPA (closest point of
approach).
That’s a big deal to me. I think we must un-
derstand that when you’re on the defensive,
you’re always subject to surprise attack, and I
want to create some strategies where the enemy
is on the defensive. For example, in Chinese wa-
ters, we can threaten attack with our missile
ships and our submarines.
Jerry Brown: On a side note here, I have up
on the screen February 5, 1991. It was the USS
Missouri, and she lobbed 2,000 700-pound shells
against the Iraqi command bunkers near the
Kuwaiti coastline.
Wayne Hughes: You’ve got to capture that. I
think the story of theMissouri is vital to our un-
derstanding of the development of modern tac-
tics and operations at sea.
Mike Garrambone: How do you see seques-
tration and the austerity it brings affecting oper-
ations research education?
Wayne Hughes: Of course there’s an effect,
but from where I sit, at the Naval Postgraduate
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School, the Operations Research Department
here is healthy, and with some negligible prob-
lems, important to us, but in the bigger picture,
small stuff like hiring new faculty—new, young
faculty to replace our old faculty. We’re healthy
in terms of students, we are healthy in terms of
leadership, we’re healthy in terms of faculty,
and we’re healthy in terms of the research going
on. School-wise, sequestration is causingproblems
that you’re aware of MORS-wide and education-
wide in military education.
For example, we are losing some of our best,
young computer science faculty. They’re going
off to Silicon Valley and getting paid more.
They’re willing to stay here as long as they can
do their research, as long as they can travel, as
long as they can enjoy the benefits of the aca-
demic world, but when those benefits are being
curtailed, then they say, ‘‘I’m going to go make
money instead of doing things the academic
way.’’ And there are other requirements, which
I think are also suffering.We are being subject to
a possible drawdown in the whole faculty at the
Postgraduate School, one of the dumbest things
I’ve ever heard of.
This is part of the larger problem I see,
which is a Department of Defense and a Navy
Department that is getting frozen into place
and not adaptable enough, and modernizable
enough for a time when flexibility, adaptability,
and modernizability are all crucial to the future
of our Department of Defense. I think we are
breeding a leadership that is trying to be perfect,
and the only way to make no mistakes is to
never make a decision. I’d like to see a few
bad decisions if they are in a stream of good de-
cisions that foster change.
Mike Garrambone: How about a follow-up
question? I know that you have been reading
abookbyAirChiefMarshall LordHughDowding
as a MORS book review and recently you com-
mented about this individual’s persistence in
developing a methodology or tactics, if you
will, applied within the Battle of Britain. Was
there anything you might comment on about
such a commander that high up in the food
chain?
Wayne Hughes: That’s a great question. In
a lesser respect, the singular Battle of Britain,
of which Air Marshall Dowding was my hero,
and I think your hero as well, the lesser question
was whether Lanchester laws, that is to say the
advantage of massing force, would work in the
air, and Dowding, whether he knew it or not, as-
sumed the opposite. He assumed that getting
the right forces in the right position, and then
engaging in small groups where the British
forces had the advantage was far more impor-
tant than trying to mass large formations of
fighters against large formations of bombers.
He was absolutely right.
For example, Go¨ring started out thinking
that he could bomb Britain into submission, be-
cause ‘‘the bombers will always get through.’’
Yet in the end, the German formations were of-
ten sending three fighters for every bomber sim-
ply because the British defense, as you know,
much aided by radar early warning, and opera-
tions analysis, was destroying the bombers in
great numbers.
Dowding was a hero in another way. He
was very much involved in the period 1933 to
1936 in the development of the Spitfire and the
Hurricane, and it was not easy to design the air-
craft to be efficient. If the question is, ‘‘Is Dow-
ding a hero of mine?’’ The answer is, ‘‘Yes,
totally.’’
Mike Garrambone: It seems strange that he
got relieved shortly after the end of the battle.
It seems somewhat unusual to be called the vic-
tor of the battle and then lose your job.
Wayne Hughes:Well, during the war, he had
to step on toes, and there was an instance when
he said something unforgiveable to Churchill,
and Churchill never forgot it, and there were
other people who were more diplomatic, but
less willing to tell it like it is. They poo-pooed
Dowding and bad-mouthed him. So too early
in the war, he was relieved and sent home,
and thatwas a shame, butwe can still remember
him fondly and honor him. This happened in
November 1940 just after he won the Battle of
Britain, and I guess before a lot of the night
bombing campaigns when the Germans started
spraying bombs on cities as opposed to the tar-
geted bombings that the Germans intended.
Jerry Brown: I have a question sent byMarine
Captain Bethany Kauffman: ‘‘In the first inter-
view, Captain Hughes talked about being inter-
disciplinary, having one foot in the analytic
community, and the other in the Navy. He also
mentioned being drawn to both the hard and
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soft sciences. How do you reconcile these
worlds as an officer analyst? Are there any spe-
cific times in your career where you feel you
were best able to bring these together as unique
skillsets?’’
Wayne Hughes: I think I’ve answered the
first part—the skillsets I think are the most im-
portant. Thinking on the question, what specific
times in my career did I feel that I was best able
to bring together these skills, the answer is ev-
ery time after I graduated from the Naval Post-
graduate School.
In my day, there was no notion of a special-
ization. We got into career specialization later.
Operations research was one of the curricula
that was specifically designed for line officers
whoweregoing to seabecauseof aphilosophy—I
think I remember this correctly—that using quan-
titative methods, and the desire to be objective,
and to help a decision maker make decisions
applied in everything you did, whether it was
at sea, on a staff, or in Washington, and the no-
tion that you only contributed when you were
filling a P-coded OR billet never entered my
mind.
In fact, I thought that as Commanding Offi-
cer, I was even advising myself using quantita-
tive methods and I do believe that for me
every tour was a payback tour. Therewere some
duty stations, of course, where the results were
more visible, like participating as a plank owner
in OP-96, our new SystemsAnalysis Division, in
amajor influential study called ‘‘TheMajor Fleet
Escort Study.’’ Another was my time as the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Analysis at
ASWFORLANT (Anti-SubmarineWarfare Force,
Atlantic), when I designed and we did sea exer-
cises in complicated and tricky ways. But we al-
ways analyzed results and strived to give
objective answers, and I learned to admire this
work because I was in ASW—the work of the
Submarine Development Group in New London
and the whole SOSUS (Sound Surveillance
System) community.
Again andagain, all of these experiences inter-
acted and if I had my way, every officer with an
operations research degree or a systems engineer-
ing analysis degree or a degree for our special
forces from the Defense Analysis Department,
would keep one foot in the operating world and
one foot in the research and analytical world.
Jerry Brown: SeaPower magazine is printing
a short paper called ‘‘A Business Strategy for
Shipbuilders’’ emphasizing affordability, which
I believe is an open door for you to talk about
small ships.
Wayne Hughes: Yes. Thank you, Jerry, for
that lead in. Everybody knows I’m a champion
of a more distributable fleet. That pretty quickly
morphs into ships and aircraft not trying to do
too many things. The problem with the new
LCS (littoral combat ship) is that the more it
tried to do a variety of things, the more expen-
sive it got, and the more expensive it got, the
more burdens we put on it.
So our Navy really needs to be broken into
two kinds of ships—one for blue water and
one for in-shore water. And the in-shore ship
that is assigned to counter swarms and counter
submarines and counter mines would be better
performed in single-purpose ships. When you
lose a ship performing one mission, you lose it
for performing all missions, so in that sense
it’s putting too many eggs in one basket, even
for a small ship the size of an LCS with its three
different tactical modules.
The SeaPower article also gives a rundown
of what has changed that influenced the design
of the modern fleet, and how the results of that
lead to conclusions about what we should be
doing like re-emphasizing submarines and un-
dersea capabilities for forward operations, and
build our sea-based air capability in other ways
than on CVNs (nuclear aircraft carriers) because
a ship that is very large can only be in one place
in one time, and it can’t go places where it can be
subject to attack.
So we need two kinds of ships, and we can
crib from other navies of the world so ship-
builders won’t have to invest too much into
new technology or anything else if we just see
what the rest of the world is doing and build
ships like the SwedishVisby andChineseHoubeis.
The smaller combatants like our old PHMs
(patrol hydrofoil missiles) are a good model if
you take off their hydrofoil and make them less
expensive and not so fast.
All of those things, our shipbuilders might
do to get ready. Why do we need to get ready?
Because the distributable power of modern
technology with modern detection tracking
and targeting systems has made it possible for
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very long and medium range missiles to
threaten big ships and keep them from going
in harm’s way. I’d like to have ships that can
go in and mix it up like the PT boats of World
War II did in the Mediterranean, and the Solo-
mons, and in the Philippines Campaigns.
All of the advantages are demonstrable in
a variety of analytical ways. I named one, which
is to show mathematically the cost disadvan-
tage of having a ship put out of action if it’s a
multipurpose ship versus the cost of the cheaper
ship being put out of action if it’s a single-purpose
ship. The salvo equations also show that numbers
are the most valuable thing you can have, and
there are other ways of demonstrating in a world
wherewe canbe attacked at sea amoredistributed
capability is the wave of the future. That’s true
now in the missile age, and it’s going to get worse
when we get into the age of autonomous systems
and robotic warfare.
Jerry Brown: As a follow-up, displaying on
my screen here is an article by Marine General
Paxton last week who was on record as saying
that the LCS and the joint high-speed vessel
are both of marginal value to the Marines for
Marine operations.
Wayne Hughes: I think he’s looking ahead,
and it’s a little bit of a marketing ploy. I don’t
knowwhether he’s trying to sustain theMarine
Corps amphibious fleet as we know it, which is
a very bad thing to do, and unaffordable be-
sides, or whether he’s trying to lean us away
from LCS as transports of Marines. There’s def-
initely a role for smaller combatants in many
places around the world and smaller offensive
Marine detachments.
There’s a role for LCS, and we’re going
to have 32 of them for accompanying JHSVs
(joint high-speed vessels), which are essen-
tially small, high-speed transports, and there’s
definitely a role for ground forces being deliv-
ered to critical areas at high speed when there
are very imminent threats. LCS and JHSVs
can be where the action is going to be. They
can’t come from the US, but they can be in Sin-
gapore, they can be in Subic, they can be in
Sasebo, or Yokosuka, and they can be in or near
the Persian Gulf and of course they can be in
our shrinking number of bases in the Mediter-
ranean. I have no quarrel with him saying that
LCS is marginal for Marine Corps functions,
but it was never designed to support the Ma-
rine Corps.
Jerry Brown: I’d like to ask a follow-up ques-
tion. One of the unexpected side effects of LCS is
we’re using the rest of the US Navy as a school-
house to produce experienced petty officers that
can staff the LCS in small numbers. Is this an un-
expected result of these smaller ships that you
favor?
Wayne Hughes: On campus here we have
a new Littoral Operations Center. That center
has fostered LCS alumni. There are three or four
of them on campus now that have served in the
early LCSs and they want to fix it. They don’t
want to eliminate it; they want to fix the weak-
nesses they observed first hand. All of their crit-
icisms are of the kind Jerry was talking about
rather than the absurd criticisms that you read
in the blog sites.
One is that the technology makes it very
hard for a crew of 98 to be up on the step for all
different missions. They have a solution. I don’t
need to talk about it here. They’re now going to
be talking about how tomake itmore effective of-
fensively. They have also pointed out that the
commissioning crews, our best and brightest
people, the petty officers are high quality and
the officers are interested in small combatants.
Some of themwant tomake careers of LCS-sized
ships and they are some of our future leaders.
But they’re already stretched in trying to
make LCS do everything that it’s going to do.
It’s an unexpected consequence of putting too
much technology on the ship. What they are
foreseeing is that as we go to 32 ships, we will
run out of quality people to man all those ships,
and the Navy will suffer as we drain it of some
of our best officers, or the ships will suffer be-
cause they’re manned with less than first-rate
officers and petty officers. That’s a big deal.
MTP (manpower, training, and personnel) is
very much a part of the future of a successful
LCS or other small combatant program.
Bob Sheldon:We thank you for having set us
up with Admiral Mullen for the oral history in-
terview we did of him, and I assume you had
a chance to read the first draft. After Admiral
Mullen left your tutelage at NPS and went out
into the big Navy, any comments about how
he exercised his skills using his analytic training
he got from you?
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Wayne Hughes: Probably themost important
thing to say is blessedly he didn’t become an op-
erations research specialist. He knew why he
was here. He was here to learn how to use quan-
titative methods to make better decisions the
way I described the virtues that I felt when I
was a graduate of operations research. Except
for being an aide and CNO (Chief of Naval Op-
erations), I don’t think he did payback tours
that were directly related to using quantitative
methods. But yes, I read his interview and I
thought he accurately described the ways and
means of future top-level Navy leaders profit-
ing from their graduate school.
I’ve got to say, the poor guy likeMikeMullen
did coming through here as a commander had to
struggle, and I’m sure he picked me because he
thought I’d be a soft touch as his thesis advisor
and in a sense I was, but when I went back and
read his thesis, I was more impressed than I was
when he was writing it, at the quality, ingenuity,
creativity, and mathematical prowess that was
imbedded in that thesis.
Jerry Brown: I can add a side note. I was in
Washington with Mike last week when he was
inducted into the National Academy of Engi-
neering. He and Deb had flown a red eye from
San Francisco to make the meeting after he
had eulogizedRobinWilliams atRobinWilliams’
funeral, because Robin Williams had been so
generous with his time with the USO and with
Wounded Warriors, but that’s typical of Mike
Mullen.
Mike Garrambone: I think an idea that might
be tough here is the concept of using smart OR
guys to figure out how to make a smaller Navy.
Wayne Hughes: I don’t want to have a smaller
Navy. I want it to be a bigger Navy of smaller
ships. [Laughs] And (CDR) Harrison Schramm is
in a better position to answer that question than
I am, but I think the evidence is there, and it
would take a long time to go through it all, but
if you look back at Hughes’ recent articles in the
Naval War College Review and the Naval Institute
Proceedings, you will find a litany of examples go-
ing back all the way to ‘‘22 Questions for Street
Fighter’’ written in the early 1990s.
Admiral Art Cebrowski was a disciple of
mine when he was a lieutenant. Then I became
a guy who helped him, and he wanted to use
quantitative methods, so he wrote a paper and
I became the coauthor of it. I decided it was
too vague, so I wrote a follow-up to it on the
use of Street Fighters, and we started the first
effort to design a Street Fighter-like ship. Then
it grew into an LCS-like ship, and that was
a pity. We designed in the year 2000 a ship for
him of 500 tons that was very lethal and could
do the kinds of things that he wanted, The
salvo equations show how effective it is in
a combat situation.
Most of the hurdles to be overcome are
things like ‘‘Are all different submarines more
important, and regional logistics?’’ And they
get complicated in a hurry because the scenes
of action, including the difference between the
East and South China Sea and the Sea of Japan
and Persian Gulf and Baltic. The different loca-
tions each have different specific answers to
the questions of logistics and sustainment, but
I think we’re on the fringe of learning that
if we develop new tactics to go with the new
technology of small combatants, that we will
convince ourselves that a portion of the Navy
should be smaller so we can have more ships
with fewer sailors at sea, and be ready for
missile warfare, and ready for autonomous
warfare.
I have a closing comment regardingAdmiral
Mullen’s oral history. The interview was so can-
did that you could say I used it as amodel of can-
dor in telling you what I think as opposed to
what would be discreet or polite or an attempt
to say nothing perfectly.
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